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INTERORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT 
  






Kathleen L. McGinn 






We investigate how structural features of negotiations can affect interaction processes and how 
negotiations can be not only a solution to, but also a source of, inter-organizational conflict. 
Principals, agents, and teams face different sets of constraints and opportunities in negotiations. 
We develop grounded theory detailing how the micro-interactions comprising a negotiation are 
shaped by the representation structure (principals, agents, or teams) of the parties. In qualitative 
and quantitative analyses of negotiations carried out by principals, agents, and teams in a 
laboratory experiment, we find that negotiators’ efforts to manage the constraints and 
opportunities of their representation structure are reflected in the micro-interactions, the broad 
improvisations, and the resulting substantive and relational outcomes.  
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 In organizations, negotiations are used to settle disputes and to determine the terms of 
agreement in transactions and cooperative endeavors.  As a result, negotiations are often 
conceptualized as a means of managing or resolving conflict.  But, while the process of 
negotiation may be a solution to conflict in some cases, it may be a source of conflict in others.  
The constraints and opportunities experienced by parties negotiating on behalf of their 
organizations and the need to simultaneously manage relational and task dynamics in inter-
organizational negotiations, open up the possibility of exacerbating conflict between 
organizations.  
Inter-organizational negotiations present choices regarding who will negotiate on 
behalf of the organization. Owners or principals might engage in negotiation, but individual 
agents or teams may also represent the organization. While research comparing team versus 
individual negotiations suggests that different party representations affect the process and 
outcomes of negotiations (Polzer 1996; Thompson et al. 1996), no consensus has evolved 
regarding the advantages and constraints of the various negotiation party structures. Despite the 
critical resources at stake, little is known about the relative pros and cons of negotiating alone for 
one’s own interests, sending an agent, or relying on a team. 
In this chapter, we explore how party representation affects negotiation processes and 
how those processes may affect conflict during and after the interaction. We build on the extant 
literature on negotiation processes, which emphasizes the interactive, dynamic, and 
improvisational nature of negotiations (e.g., McGinn and Keros 2002; Weingart et al. 1999) but 
does not provide a theory for how negotiation interaction and outcomes might be shaped by 
structural variables, such as party representation. Our perspective is inspired by a grammatical 
approach to examining organizational processes (Pentland 1995). This enables us to bridge micro 
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and macro understandings of negotiation process and provide theoretical and analytical traction 
on the question of how structural features play out in negotiations. 
A Process Perspective on Negotiations 
A process approach to negotiations concentrates interest and analyses on the interaction 
itself. Outcomes are seen as necessarily dependent on the emergent interaction, rather than 
directly attributable to exogenous independent variables. Process and outcomes are inextricably 
linked as perceptions and expectations of outcomes affect the unfolding process, which in turn 
affects the outcomes realized.   
Research on negotiation processes considers task- and relationship-oriented behaviors 
(Gelfand et al. 2006; Wilson and Putnam 1990). Task-related behaviors include both substantive 
and procedural acts. Substantive acts—such as exchanges of information, questions, and offers—
are the heart of most negotiation process analyses (e.g., Thompson 1991; Weingart et al. 1999).  
Procedural acts, such as discussions of how to structure the interaction (Lytle et al. 1999) and 
assessments of progress against time (Lau & Murnighan 2005), help define a structure for 
substantive exchanges.  Relational acts can serve task-related functions as well (Kolb and 
Williams 2000, 2003), but they are distinct in that they reveal or affect the relationship between 
the parties and contribute to the relational positioning between actors (e.g., Adair and Brett 2005; 
Gelfand et al. 2006). Relational acts may be central to understanding the effects of party 
representation on negotiation process and outcome. 
Process research has ranged from the micro level, counting the frequency of different 
words or phrases (e.g., Weingart et al. 1999; Weingart et al. 1990), to a higher level of analysis 
examining the patterns and stages of interaction (e.g., Adair and Brett 2005; Olekalns et al. 
1996), to a more macro approach exploring how emergent logics shape the repertoires of action 
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within a negotiation (e.g., Kolb 1985; McGinn and Keros 2002). Each level of analysis has 
offered new insights into the paths toward different negotiation outcomes.   
Frequency counts of specific types of behaviors, information sharing for example, led to 
a more dynamic, interactive theory of negotiation (Weingart et al.1993;Weingart et al. 1999). 
Research exploring the dynamic aspects of bargaining revealed how meaning is created through 
conversational structure and language and identified behavioral sequences and strategies that 
delimit the range of actions available to negotiators as bargaining progresses (Olekalns and 
Weingart 2003; Valley et al. 1992). Studies examining interaction at the level of the negotiation 
exposed how negotiator roles lead to different behavioral repertoires (Kolb 1985; Putnam and 
Jones 1982a).  Collectively, these results imply that parties are not simply choosing among all 
available task- and relationship-oriented behaviors, nor are they following pre-set scripts.  
Instead, negotiations exhibit ―a coherent sequence of actions and responses created, chosen, and 
carried out by the parties during the social interaction‖ (McGinn and Keros 2002, 445).  Just as 
jazz musicians’ improvisations are guided by the melody, harmony, and rhythm of a song, 
negotiators co-create the interaction through an interdependent process of active response to the 
emergent constraints and opportunities of the unfolding interaction (Balachandra et al. 2005).  To 
do so, negotiators must simultaneously structure their interaction and then improvise within the 
structure that they co-create. 
While the improvisational approach suggests that emergent logics guide negotiation 
interaction, it fails to develop how these logics might act as a theoretical bridge between micro-
interaction and structural variables, such as party representation. Pentland’s (1992; 1995) work 
on grammars of organizational processes presents a useful theoretical and methodological 
approach to linking structure and process.  In their examination of organizational routines, 
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Pentland and Reuter (1994) focus on both micro-interaction and macro-logics of interaction, 
which they call grammars.  Grammars, like improvisations, are logics for interaction that guide, 
but do not determine, how individuals combine acts in practice. Social actors choose from a 
repertoire of available actions within a logic of interaction (Giddens 1976, 1984; Pentland 1995).  
Grammars reflect the constraints and opportunities that technological, institutional, cultural, and 
coordination structures place on the actions available (Pentland 1995).   
In this chapter, we present a typology of improvisations that guide and emerge out of 
micro-interactions between negotiating parties. Just as grammars of organizational routines 
reflect features of the organizational context, improvisations reflect negotiators’ responses to the 
negotiation context (Lingo and O'Mahony 2010). More specifically, we suggest that 
improvisations reflect negotiators’ efforts to manage the constraints and opportunities presented 
by the presence of teams, agents, or principals at the negotiating table. 
Party Representation: Constraints and Opportunities  
Prior work focusing on the effect of party representation in negotiations suggests that 
principals, teams, and agents face differing constraints and opportunities at the bargaining table, 
which may differentially affect the extent to which conflict emerges. We conceptualize these 
constraints and opportunities around three domains: (a) the knowledge and skills that parties 
bring to bear on the negotiation; (b) the potential development of cross-party identification, trust, 
or relational conflict; and (c) coordination and communication. In this section, we summarize the 
challenges and opportunities imposed by each representation structure and its likely influence on 
the emergence of conflict and negotiated outcomes. 
The primary constraint for individuals negotiating as principals is that of knowledge and 
skill: information processing is limited by the capacity constraints of a single person. However, 
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principals negotiating with other principals need only to interpret the actions of one person, 
reducing the possibility for confusion due to multiple parties’ potentially conflicting statements 
and actions.  Because of the more intimate setting, principals negotiating one-on-one have the 
opportunity to experience relational connection with the other party, especially in face-to-face 
bargaining (McGinn and Crosen 2004), increasing the likelihood of cross-party identification and 
trust. As a result, two principals negotiating with one another may find it straightforward to 
develop a shared understanding of how interaction should unfold, lessening the risk of 
unproductive relationship conflict (Jehn 1997). 
Agents, like individuals, must deal on their own with the complexity of information and 
interpretation, but they also face their own portfolio of constraints and opportunities. Agents 
must struggle with attempting to build working relationships with their negotiating counterparts 
while simultaneously maintaining credibility and integrity with their constituents not present at 
the table (Walton and McKersie 1965). As a result, agents may be less likely than principals to 
develop cross-party identification and trust (Kramer et al. 1993), which may heighten the risk of 
conflict. For instance, agents have been shown to use threats, pressure tactics, and non-
cooperative behaviors in negotiations to signal concern for their constituents (Bacharach and 
Lawler 1981; Enzle et al. 1992) and increased accountability for the outcome relative to teams 
(O'Connor 1997).  Thus, research has shown that while agents may improve outcomes when they 
reach agreement, they also have been shown to increase the likelihood of impasse (Bazerman et 
al. 1992) and to negotiate more contentiously (O'Connor 1997).  
Negotiations between teams offer the potential for greater information processing 
capacity and multiple perspectives. Teams’ greater breadth in expertise, working styles, and 
approaches to problems can lead to creativity and robust decision-making (Jackson 1992). 
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Multiple negotiators allow teams to allocate socio-emotional and task-related roles to different 
people, whereas individuals may find it difficult to fulfill these roles simultaneously (Friedman 
and Podolny 1992). But negotiation teams may be constrained by information processing errors 
unique to groups (Brodbeck et al. 2007; Mannix et al. 1989). Problems such as conformity 
pressure (Janis 1982), premature arrival at the first solution recommended, and the domination of 
a particular person over minority or diverging opinions present constraints for teams (Maier 
1983). Coordination constraints and in-group bias may inhibit the development of trust and 
cooperation across negotiating parties (Polzer 1996) and increase the likelihood of dysfunctional 
forms of conflict (Jehn, 1997; Jehn and Mannix 2001; Bendersky and Hayes 2010).  A shortage 
of trust between parties is a precursor to defensive behavior, including withholding information 
and aggressive statements attacking the others’ position (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
The constraints and opportunities of each representation structure are summarized in 
Table 1.  In sum, extant research consistently demonstrates that teams, agents, and individuals 
face different constraints and opportunities in their negotiations but provides mixed information 
that limits accurate predictions regarding how party representation might manifest in a given 
negotiation.  
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METHODS 
Participants and Overview  
One hundred-eight participants, recruited through advertising at universities in a major 
metropolitan area, participated in one of ten sessions of the experiment.
1
 Participants were 
assigned one of two negotiation roles and matched with strangers in one of three party 
representation conditions: individual (one principal negotiates with another principal), agent (one 
individual representing a 3-person team negotiates with one other individual representing a 3-
person team), or team (three individuals assigned to one team negotiate with three individuals 
assigned to another team). This resulted in thirty-four face-to-face negotiations—nine individual 
negotiations, 15 agent negotiations, and ten team negotiations.  
The negotiation scenario simulated a transaction between representatives of a town 
council and representatives of a logging company operating in the area.
2
  The role materials 
described five issues: one compatible issue (both parties received high payoffs with the same 
option); two trade-off issues (one party placed high value on the first issue and low value on the 
second, while the reverse was true for the other party); one distributive issue (the parties’ payoffs 
were opposed); and one integrative issue (maximum joint gain was achieved with an alternative 
that neither party preferred individually).  
Experimental Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of two roles (the Town of Silva 
or the Shaded Glen Logging Company) and a representation structure condition (individual, 
agent, or team). To manipulate representation structure, we varied the role instructions and 
number of people negotiating on each side, the priming during negotiation preparation, and 
                                                          
1
 This study was conducted as part of a larger project that looked at the effect of communication media (electronic or 
face-to-face) and three different representation conditions (team, individual, and agent) on negotiation outcomes.   
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payoffs. The details are provided in Table 2.  To prime for representation structure while keeping 
the potential for information processing during preparation constant, all participants prepared for 
15 minutes in face-to-face groups of three. However, instructions for the preparation phase 
varied across roles. All participants were paid a show-up fee, plus their earnings in the 
negotiation, but the method of calculating earnings varied by treatment.  
After the fifteen-minute preparation period, participants joined their negotiation 
counterparts in private negotiation rooms for up to 30 minutes. All interactions were audio 
recorded.  Following the negotiations, participants turned in agreement forms listing the details 
of their agreements and individually completed questionnaires regarding their perceptions of the 
negotiation process and outcome and their perceptions of the other party. Participants were 
privately paid and given a debrief sheet explaining the study’s purpose.  
Coding Transcripts for Negotiation Acts 
Thirty-three negotiations
3
 were transcribed and analyzed.  Our coding proceeded through 
three general steps: inductively generating a coding scheme; coding speaking turns; and 
identifying patterns or regularities of underlying improvisational logics. Following existing 
negotiation coding schemes (Adair and Brett 2005; Weingart et al. 1999; Weingart et al. 1990), 
we coded each transcript at the level of the speaking turn. 
We inductively developed micro-level coding categories based on an iterative process in 
the spirit of grounded theory development (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Two of the authors read 
through the transcripts to get a sense of behaviors arising during the negotiations. In keeping 
with the extant literature, we distinguished between substantive acts and procedural acts, which 
we coded as sub-categories of task-related acts, and relational acts focused on the parties 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2
 Loosely based on the Twin Lakes exercise (Lewicki and Litterer 2006).  
3
 One agent negotiation was omitted from the study due to a recording error.  
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themselves. Relational acts worked in two directions: acts of connection reflected or drove a 
positive relationship; acts of separation reflected or drove a negative relationship. When we 
found that what we had conceived of as a single code was too broad, we broke the code down 
further. This resulted in 32 separate codes—17 relational acts; 11 substantive acts; 3 procedural 




Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
We attempted to interpret behaviors or messages as they were received, rather than trying 
to infer the speaker’s interpretation. Because messages can serve more than one function 
(Weingart et al. 1990), our coding scheme allowed each speaking turn to receive up to two of the 
32 codes—one of the task codes, either substantive or procedural, and/or one relational code. If 
there was no identifiable task or relational function for a speaking turn, it was coded as filler.  
Each transcript was coded independently by two of three coders (two of the authors and one 
coder blind to the hypotheses and conditions). After coding, reliability was calculated using the 
ratio of the number of exact agreements to the number of potential coding units (which varied by 
transcript due to differences in the length of the negotiations). Average agreement rate across the 
two coders on each transcript was 71%, significantly higher than chance (< 5%). Disagreements 
were resolved through discussion among the coders.    
Inductively Deriving Improvisations 
We inductively derived the macro-logics of interaction, or improvisations, by identifying 
and analyzing patterns of micro-interaction.  We began our analysis of the detailed micro-coding 
                                                          
4
 The coding scheme and a full description of the micro-acts and representative examples are available from the first 
author on request.  
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by creating a visual behavioral pattern map for each negotiation, assigning each major code a 
different color and collapsing to the codes presented in bold in Table 3. Similar codes were 
assigned shades in the same color range. The pattern map for each negotiation comprised task 
codes in a top row, over a bottom row of relational codes. Each speaking turn was given one 
column, resulting in pattern maps that were made up of two rows and dozens to hundreds of 
columns (depending on the number of speaking turns), as in the illustration, below: 
                                   
                                   
 
By allowing statements to have a separate relational code, we elevated the relational component 
beyond positive affect or negative affect to more directly address the cross-party identification 
dynamics that serve as constraints or opportunities across party representation conditions.  
Relational acts may serve to define, build, and reinforce the emerging relationship between 
parties, or they may create separation or conflict between parties. 
Using the pattern maps, we identified dynamic regularities that might be missed by 
frequency counts or markov chain analysis. The pattern maps helped us recognize improvisations 
by the visual similarities within and differences across their behavioral mappings. After 
transcripts had been coded and mapped, two authors read the transcripts and independently wrote 
a story of each negotiation, detailing the tone, content, and rhythm of what unfolded, as if they 
were describing the negotiation to someone else. Combined with the pattern mapping, these 
stories helped us identify improvisations and the underlying logics that distinguished them. We 
first grouped together negotiations that were nearly identical in their maps and stories, then 
pulled in those that were somewhat more distinct, working in rounds until all negotiations fit into 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Task codes (Substantive and Procedural) 
Relational codes 
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one of the sets. We then reviewed the negotiations within each set to assure that those included 





We identified five improvisations varying in the type, pattern, and complexity of task-
related and relational acts: Building Relationships; Working Together; Haggling; Asymmetry; 
and Changing Logics. Summary descriptions of each improvisation are presented in Table 4.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here  
----------------------------------- 
Negotiations characterized by a Building Relationships improvisation focused primarily 
on the parties’ interpersonal relationship. In these negotiations, the parties acted with little 
apparent concern over the negotiation’s economic outcome. Relational acts emphasized bringing 
the parties together and included few, if any, acts of separation. Information exchange was 
superficial. Questions, primarily inquiring about the other party’s preferences, were couched in 
language of concern and understanding. Both parties tended toward easy acceptance of the 
other’s offers and often invoked the term ―compromise‖ to describe the interaction. Procedurally, 
there was a notable absence of cycling through issues.  Instead, parties relying on a logic of 
building a relationship dealt with one issue at a time, came to a resolution on that issue, and then 
moved on to the next.  Overall, little effort was extended toward the task, but substantial effort 
was directed toward the relationship.  
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Working Together improvisations reflected a logic of honesty, cross-party identification, 
and problem solving toward a mutually beneficial conclusion. Participants exchanged 
information couched in empathetic and flexible language. When discussions bogged down, 
parties sometimes used pressure tactics to push toward an optimal solution, or one of the parties 
would offer a suggestion for an alternative approach and the other party would accept it. 
Openness to discussion and shared understanding were evident throughout. Congratulatory 
statements punctuated the interactions, especially after a mutually satisfactory tentative 
agreement was reached and at the negotiation’s end. The few separation statements used in 
working together negotiations were not reciprocated by the other party. 
Haggling improvisations are characterized by a logic of getting the best possible deal for 
oneself, regardless of the effect this might have on the other party. Parties exchanged positions at 
the negotiation’s start without asking for or offering underlying reasons and then progressed 
through a series of offers, counteroffers, and rejections. At times, the parties exchanged 
disrespect for one another’s statements: ―I don’t understand why….you’re arguing with us….we 
wouldn’t be allowed to do XX.‖ The few relational acts present in haggling improvisations 
typically involved interruptions and negative value statements regarding the other party’s 
behavior or the progress of the interaction, including exhortations such as ―I don’t trust you.‖ 
Ironically, the exceptions to this were the positive value statements at the negotiation’s 
conclusion when parties exchanged comments such as ―good job.‖ 
In Asymmetric improvisations, one party assumed or worked under one of the previously 
described logics, while the other party assumed or worked under another (McGinn and Keros 
2002).  For example, in one negotiation, the logging company representative tried to work with 
the other party toward a mutually advantageous agreement—providing information about 
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underlying preferences and attempting to bring the parties together—while the town negotiator 
haggled—simply making offers or counteroffers. Negotiations were asymmetric along relational, 
procedural, or substantive lines, or combinations of the three. In all of these cases, asymmetric 
negotiations reflected a lack of shared understanding and unmatched approaches to the 
negotiation.  
Changing Logics improvisations were characterized by multiple shared logics, shifting 
over time. Early task-related acts and bringing together statements celebrated successes, but 
these hard-earned first agreements were often followed by mixed relational or substantive 
messages as negotiators attempted to achieve better outcomes. These shifts often stemmed from 
and, in turn, added to confusion, frequently resulting in a spiral of acts of separation. Eventually, 
one or both parties realized that the interaction was being unproductive, and someone would 
begin the process of bringing the parties back together through positive relational and substantive 
acts, often after explicit procedural suggestions for a different approach. Any one excerpt from a 
negotiation exhibiting a changing logics improvisation would be insufficient to identify the 
underlying flexibility of this improvisation; it was through twists and turns involving a full 
spectrum of relational, substantive, and procedural acts that the parties reached mutually 
beneficial agreements. 
Party Representation, Improvisations and Outcomes 
In addition to inducing and describing the improvisational logics above, we also 
conducted quantitative analyses of the relationships among party representation, improvisations, 
and outcomes. First, we examined the effects of party representation on three types of outcomes 
typically studied in the negotiations literature: 1) the joint value of the outcome achieved across 
the two parties in the negotiation, 2) the difference between or distribution of the payoff across 
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the parties, and 3) survey measures of parties’ post-negotiation perceptions of trust and the 
competitiveness of the interaction (i.e. 7-point scales, 1 = not at all; 7 = very).
5
 The joint value of 
the negotiated agreement was calculated as the sum of the two parties’ monetary payoffs (Joint 
Gain). Difference in payoffs was the absolute value of the difference between parties’ monetary 
outcomes, divided by Joint Gain to control for ceiling effects (Difference in Payoffs).  Trust was 
measured using a five-item scale, with items such as ―To what extent did you trust the other 
party?‖ (M = 4.72; SD = .61; α = .81).  Competitiveness was measured using a three-item scale, 
with items such as, ―How competitive was the other party?‖ (M = 4.60; SD = 1.09; α = .87). 
To analyze the effects of party representation on economic and relational outcomes, we 
conducted a series of one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs). Overall, there were no 
significant effects of party representation on outcomes at the p < .05 level. Party representation 
had a marginally significant effect on trust (F(2, 30) = 2.97, p = .07), with individuals (M = 5.11, 
SD = .57) reporting higher levels of trust than teams (M = 4.51; SD = .41) or agents (M = 4.62; 
SD = .67). 
We also analyzed the association between party representation and the type of 
improvisation. Because the data are categorical and our number of observations is low, we used 
Fisher’s exact test. As shown in Table 5, the distribution of improvisations was not randomly 
distributed across the party representation treatments (Fisher’s exact = .038).  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Each party representation treatment corresponds to a different modal improvisation. 
Individuals were frequently able to jointly coordinate on a shared logic, working together, 
                                                          
5
These items are drawn from a larger survey.  The full survey is available upon request from the second author. 
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despite the fact that participants were strangers entering the negotiation. The modal 
improvisation for agents, however, was asymmetric, reflecting agents’ dual constraints of 
working within their teams’ expectations while simultaneously attempting to develop the 
relational connection that one-on-one interaction calls for.  Team negotiations were less locked 
into one logic, changing logics as needed to move the negotiation forward or as directed by the 
social interaction.  
To examine how improvisations influence economic and relational outcomes, we 
conducted one-way ANOVAs. These omnibus tests, presented in Table 6, showed that 
improvisations significantly affected difference in payoffs, trust, and perceived competitiveness 
of the interaction. Pairwise comparisons revealed that haggling led to significantly more unequal 
payoffs than did building relationships, working together, or changing logics. Tests of effects on 
attitudes revealed that those who engaged in haggling trusted the other party less than those who 
were working together. Parties who engaged in building relationships perceived the interaction 
as less competitive than those involved in haggling, changing logics, or asymmetry.  
----------------------------------- 




How do contextual features within organizations affect negotiation process and 
outcomes, and how do these processes in turn become a source of or solution to inter-
organizational conflict? A theory of improvisations as logics guiding micro-interactions offers a 
framework for understanding the link between the unfolding interaction that has been the subject 
of considerable negotiation process research and more macro features of organizations, such as 
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formalization of roles, culture, or party representation. We have shown that emergent 
improvisations in negotiations reflect the efforts of negotiators to manage the constraints and 
opportunities of their party representation.  The resulting negotiations can be not only a solution 
to, but also a source of, inter-organizational conflict. This insight may guide future studies 
examining how other organizational features affect negotiation processes and outcomes, 
including conflict between and within organizations.  
 The modal improvisations across individual, team, and agent negotiations reveal the 
parties’ attempts to manage the constraints and opportunities inherent in each representation 
condition. In one-on-one negotiations among principals, the parties were able to jointly 
coordinate on a working together improvisation, despite the fact that they were strangers entering 
the negotiation. For individuals negotiating for themselves, the working together improvisation 
reflects the immediate relational imperatives of one-on-one interaction. Individuals privileged 
the relationship while simultaneously attempting to communicate their own interests. This 
allowed them to push for better economic outcomes without falling into a negative relational 
spiral. While individuals were constrained by their limited information processing capability, 
they faced neither the confusion and information complexity facing teams, nor the conflicting 
allegiances facing agents. As a result, principals negotiating for themselves tended to engage in 
working together improvisations, resulting in more equal payoffs without sacrificing joint gain 
and relatively high levels of trust. 
In contrast, negotiations involving agents were most frequently characterized by 
asymmetric improvisations, reflecting the dual constraints of agents attempting to work within 
their teams’ expectations, while also attempting to develop the relational connection that one-on-
one, face-to-face interaction elicits (Sally 1995). Asymmetric negotiations often involved one 
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party exploiting the other with a haggling improvisation while the other utilized a building a 
relationship or working together improvisation throughout. Agents seemed constrained in their 
ability to manage the trust-testing process needed to develop cross-party identification and trust, 
and conflict emerged during interaction. Further, agents lacked the information processing 
capability that enabled teams to develop a shared understanding of the negotiation despite the 
complexity of the substantive and relational exchanges and potential constraints of within-team 
bias. 
The modal improvisation for teams, changing logics, responds to the relational, 
substantive, and procedural constraints of this representation structure. Team negotiations 
changed logics as needed to move the negotiation forward or as directed by the social interaction. 
Team interactions reflect the potential constraints on developing cross-party trust and the 
information complexity inherent to their party representation structure. Negotiations between 
teams were likely to draw on multiple perceptions, working styles, and approaches.  In some 
negotiations, team members adopted differentiated social or task-related roles as needed in the 
negotiation. For example, as one team member pushed hard for a certain outcome, another team 
member offered group identification statements that helped bring the parties back to the table to 
offset a separation cycle. The changing logics improvisation reflected teams’ ability to develop a 
shared understanding, while also remaining flexible enough to adapt if the negotiation devolved 
into conflict. Although changing logics allowed teams to achieve relatively high joint gains and 
balanced distributions, changing logics did not result in the positive relational outcomes of those 
engaging in the working together improvisation.  
We suggest that a focus on both micro-interaction and macro-improvisational logics 
provides a more robust and dynamic theoretical frame than those that privilege the frequency of 
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certain actions (Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Taylor 2002; Thompson and Hrebec 1996; Thompson 
1991), the response-cue relationships among acts and interacts (Bazerman et al. 1992; Taylor and 
Donald 2003; Weingart et al. 1999), or gestalt improvisations (McGinn and Keros 2002).  Multi-
level analyses also draw attention to critical transition points in the negotiation (Druckman 2001; 
McGinn et al. 2004), such as when actors diffuse or exacerbate a defensive exchange through 
closure or process statements (Olekalns et al. 2003). Such transition points were a hallmark of 
the changing logic negotiations, which involved movement through logics over time. 
 The approach proposed here emphasizes the relational aspects of negotiation processes 
and outcomes and offers a coding scheme for capturing relational aspects of micro-interaction. 
We were able to tease out improvisations focused solely on the relational aspect of the 
interaction, others that balanced the relational and substantive aspects, and those that 
concentrated on the substantive aspects of the negotiation to the exclusion of relational issues. 
Further research could investigate how a lack of, or focus on, the relational dimension of 
negotiations affects negotiated outcomes, conflict, and ongoing working relationships embedded 
in organizational contexts. 
A theory of improvisations as guiding logics for micro-interaction offers a useful 
methodological and theoretical framework for future studies seeking to examine how 
organizational features may affect negotiation processes and outcomes, and in turn, how 
negotiation processes may be a source of, or solution to, inter-organizational conflict. 
Organizational features introduce constraints and open up possibilities in negotiations.  Situating 
negotiations within organizations demands attention to factors such as the organization’s 
coordination structures, decision rights, formal and informal roles, and the extent of 
specialization or generalization among those involved in the negotiations (Barley 1991). Studies 
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focusing on organizational features such as accountability (O'Connor 1997), learning capability 
(Bereby-Meyer and Moran 2004), constrained authority (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Watkins 
1999; Kurtzberg et al. 1999), breadth of expertise, working styles, and approaches (Jackson 
1992) are particularly relevant to our understanding of negotiations across and within 
organizations.  Considering these features when designing and carrying out negotiations may 
enable organizations to guide the interactions so that they are a solution to, rather than a source 
of, conflict.  
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Table 1.  Party Representation: Constraints and Opportunities 
 
 Individuals Teams Agents 








Only need to 
understand and 
interpret the 































to feel liked 





































will go unnoticed 
No need to 
coordinate 
















social and task 
roles across the 
team 
Authority to 
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Table 2: Party Representation: Instructions, Preparation, and Payoff 
 
 
 Principal Agent Team 
Instructions  
―You will be interacting 
on your own, for 
yourself, with another 
individual representing 
the other party.‖ 
 
 
―You will be interacting 
individually as an agent 
of your team with an 
agent of the other 
team.‖ 
 
―Your three team 
members will be 
interacting together 
with three members of 
the other team.‖ 
Preparation  
―You will prepare for 
the social interacting for 
15 minutes with two 




―You will prepare for 
the social interaction for 
15 minutes with two 
other members of your 
team.‖ 
 
―You will prepare for 
the social interaction for 
15 minutes with two 
other members of your 
team.‖ 
Payoff  
―You will be paid $1 
for every $75,000 you 
earn over your 
minimum.‖ 
 
―Your group outcome 
will be the outcome of 
the team member who 
has the lowest outcome. 
Each member of your 
team will receive the 
same outcome – you 
will be paid $1 for 
every $75,000 the 
lowest payoff 




―Each member of your 
team will receive the 
same outcome – you 
will be paid $1 for 
every $75,000 your 
team earns over your 
minimum.‖ 
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Table 3.  Summary of Micro-interactions: Substantive, Procedural and Relational Acts 
Task-related Acts  Relational Acts 
Substantive Acts Procedural Acts  Acts of connection Acts of Separation 
Info 
Exchange  
Offering info  
I1: Exchange info about 
priorities and trade-offs 
between issues/offers 
I2: Exchange info about 
preferences wi/ issues 
I3: Share specific dollar 




















Seeking info  
Q1: Request 
exploratory information 
about others’ interests, 
priorities and rationale 
Q2: Request specific 
data and information 
about preferences 
within an issue or 







or deadlines  





concern with other’s 
position, interests, or 
well-being  
T2: Show flexibility  
T3: Make concessions 
not embedded in offers 
or counteroffers 
R. Build rapport 
Pushing the 
parties apart  
C1: Make threats and 
use pressure tactics 
C2. Defend position; 
make positional 
commitments 
C3.  Make extreme 
demands 
C4.  Refuse offer 
C5.  Evade questions 




O1: Provide offers or 
counteroffers 
O2: Accept offer  
O3. Request agreement 
or closure 











V1: Express approval, 
satisfaction, or fairness 
with the other’s 
behavior, the 
interaction, or outcome 
E1: Positive emotional 
outbursts and 
exclamations 








unfairness with the 
other’s behavior, the 




Lack of shared 
understanding  
S1:  Suggest lack of 
shared understanding.   
Filler F: Misc. or 
non-info 
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S2.  Conflicting 
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Table 4.  Improvisations and their Task-Related and Relational Acts 
 Task-related acts  
 Substantive acts Procedural acts Relational acts 
Building 
Relationships 
 Superficial info 
provision 
 Questions re: other’s 
preferences 
 Easy acceptance of 
other’s offers 
 Discuss and resolve one 
issue at a time 
 Few, if any, temporary 
solutions or circling back 
 Rapport from onset 
 Emphasis on bringing 
together 
 Many group identification 
statements 
 Few, if any, separation acts 
Working 
together 
 High levels of 
information seeking and 
exchange, in conjunction 
with bringing together 
statements 
 Reasons behind 
preferences provided 
 Complex processes, rather 
than issue x issue or full 
agenda 
 Issues left open, cycling 
back 
 Tentative solutions 




 Begins with rapport 
 Punctuated by + value and 
group identification 
statements 
 Many bringing together 
statements, in conjunction 
with information exchange 
 Periodic pressure tactics, 
but no separation spirals 
Haggling 
 Exchange positions at 
onset 
 Series of offers, 
counteroffers and 
rejections 
  Minimal q’s about or 
exchange of priorities and 
preferences 
 Periodic statements of 
other’s priorities, without 
information or 
confirmation 
 Keep issues open 
 Link issues 
 Tentative agreements 
 Periodically, getting 
―stuck‖ on issues 
 Cannot reach process 
agreements 
 Few relational acts 
 If any relational acts, 
typically negative 
 Explicit threats 
 Negative value statements 
throughout 
 Interruptions 
 Separation statements often 
lead to separation spirals 
 + value statements at 
conclusion 
Asymmetry 
 Different approaches to 
exchanging priorities or 
preferences 
 Different approaches to 
process, such as one party 
taking a sequential, single 
issue approach while the 
other takes a multi-issue 
approach  
 Different relational 
approaches, with one player 
attempting to build a 
relationship and the other 
exploiting  
 May involve party lying  




 Early exchange of 
priorities and preferences 
 Little explanation of 
differences across issues 
 Confusion when 
offers/counteroffers made 
without exchange of 
underlying rationale 
 Proceeds through distinct 
stages 
 Multiple issues open early 
 Later, some issues dealt 
with issue x issue 
 Begins with bringing 
together statements 
 Early successes celebrated 
 Failures lead to defensive 
routines and separation spirals 
 Spirals often recognized 
and halted with bringing 
together statements  
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(Pearson Χ2(8) = 16.36, p = .04) 
(Fisher’s exact = .038) 
 
Improvisation Party Representation 
 Individuals Agents Teams Total 
Building Relationship 1 3 0 4 
Working Together 5 2 1 8 
Changing Logics 1 0 4 5 
Haggling 1 2 2 5 
Asymmetry 1 7 3 11 
Total 9 14 10 33 
Teams, Agents & Individuals   32 
Table 6. Effects of Improvisations on Outcomes 
 




































(240.37) .08 (.10) 4.61 (0.19) 5.16 (0.63) 
F-Ratio for full test  
F(4, 28) = 
1.37 
F(4, 28) = 
4.87* 
F(4, 28) = 
3.81** 











  n/a 
BR/H*        
WT/H*        
CL/H*  WT/H* 
BR/H*          




Tukey pairwise post-hoc comparisons 
b 
Estimated adjusted r-squared values 
c 
Teams and agents only, n = 24 
 
